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A
fter a slow start in the 1980s, inflation-indexed government 
securities have gradually become more common in developed 
countries. A number of potential benefits arise with a gov-
ernment conducting part of its borrowing through inflation-indexed 
securities. Chief among them are better risk sharing for the economy, 
reduced government borrowing costs, less incentive for a deeply indebt-
ed government to inflate away its debt, and a new source of informa-
tion about investors’ inflation expectations. Many developed countries 
in coming decades will face the need to borrow more to finance the 
retirement of baby boomers. In the near future, a useful tool for these 
governments may be inflation-indexed securities. 
The experience of the countries that have already experimented with 
inflation-indexed government securities suggests that, to achieve the full 
benefits of these securities, liquid markets are essential. But, for inflation-
indexed securities, liquid markets do not come easily. 
This article reviews the experiences of a few countries that have issued 
inflation-indexed securities and draws some common lessons about pro-
moting market liquidity. The first section broadly describes the inflation-
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indexed security programs in a number of developed countries and high-
lights some of their common features. The second section examines the 
main potential benefits of such securities. The third section explains why 
market liquidity is essential. The fourth section draws some lessons from a 
number of countries about developing market liquidity. 
I.  COMMON  FEATURES  OF  INFLATION-INDEXED 
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
The most important feature of an inflation-indexed government se-
curity (IIGS) is that its nominal payments grow with inflation. That is, 
the real rate of return for a buy-and-hold investor is fixed at the time of 
purchasing regardless of future inflation.1 In contrast, payment for a con-
ventional debt security is fixed in nominal terms, and its real rate of return 
for a buy-and-hold investor will be inversely related to the realized inflation 
during the holding period. 
What are iiGSs?  
While governments have experimented with different forms of the 
IIGS, a fairly common structure has emerged. In this structure, the princi-
pal is indexed to grow at the same rate as an index of prices, and the cou-
pon rate is fixed at issuance. As the nominal coupon payment is equal to 
the nominal principal multiplied by the coupon rate, the nominal coupon 
payment will also grow at the same rate as the price index. At maturity, 
investors in an IIGS are paid the nominal value of the principal, which 
equals the sum of the initial principal (par) and the cumulated growth in 
the nominal principal due to realized inflation during the life of the secu-
rity. In short, both the coupon and principal payments of this kind of IIGS 
are structured such that, regardless of inflation, all payments are constant 
in terms of purchasing power.2
The price index on which the inflation adjustment is based is typi-
cally a measure of consumer prices, such as the CPI.3 Such a measure is 
preferred to a broader price index because, ultimately, investment gains will 
be used for consumption, and therefore the most relevant inflation risk for 
investors is the risk of increasing consumer prices. The same rationale also 
suggests the chosen price index should measure overall inflation for con-
sumer goods and services, as opposed to a narrower index such as core CPI, 
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a practical matter, lagged values of the price index must be used to calculate 
the inflation adjustments. This is necessary both because consumer price 
indexes are published with a delay of at least a month and because investors 
need to know the accrued inflation adjustments to trade an IIGS on the 
secondary market.
The majority of IIGSs have maturities of at least five years at issuance. 
One reason for issuing mainly long-term IIGSs is that at longer horizons 
the inflation risk these securities are designed to protect against tends to be 
more pronounced. Another reason is that with the lags in indexation, there 
is inevitably residual inflation risk. This risk is negligible for an IIGS with 
a long maturity but can be significant for an IIGS with only a few months 
left to mature. 
iiGSs in developed countries   
Since the early 1980s, a number of developed countries have ex-
perimented with inflation-indexed government securities. Among them 
are the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United 
States, Sweden, France, and Italy. Table 1 provides a summary of these 
IIGS programs.4 
table 1
INFLATION-INDExED GOvErNMENT SECUrITIES IN A 
FEW DEvELOPED COUNTrIES
 
      IIGS’ Share (%) of
Country  Starting Date  Still Active?  Total Government 
      Debt (as of year)
United Kingdom  1981  Yes  29 (2008) 
Australia  1985  No (Suspended 2003)  15 (2005) 
Canada  1994  Yes  < 2 (2007) 
Sweden  1994  Yes  26  (2007) 
New Zealand  1996  No (Suspended 1999)  - 
United States   1997  Yes  11 (2008) 
France  1998  Yes  13 (2007) 
Italy  2003  Yes  7 (2008) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the web pages of Debt Management Office, UK; re-
serve Bank of Australia; Bank of Canada; Swedish National Debt Office; Statistics New Zealand; and 
the Treasury Departments of United States, France, and Italy.
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The United Kingdom was the first developed country to issue infla-
tion-indexed government securities, or an index-linked gilt. The first index-
linked gilt was a 15-year bond issued in March 1981.5 Since then, these 
gilts have become a regular component of UK government debt financing, 
accounting for 29 percent of total government debt in 2008. 
Australia was another early adopter of the IIGS. Their first IIGS was 
issued in 1985, called a Commonwealth Government Capital Indexed 
Bond (CIB).6 Both 10-year and 20-year maturities were available at issu-
ance. Unlike in the UK, the IIGS program in Australia has played only a 
limited role in government financing. The program has been intermittent, 
partly due to changes in federal government fiscal conditions and outlooks. 
IIGSs accounted for about 15 percent of government debt in 2005, but no 
new securities have been issued since 2003.7 
Canada’s experience with IIGSs has been somewhat similar to that 
of Australia. Canada started their IIGS program in December 1991, 
issuing what they called a real-return Bond (rrB). rrBs are concen-
trated in longer maturities. This IIGS program started about the same 
time the Bank of Canada adopted formal inflation targeting. Both ini-
tiatives were part of a concerted effort by the Canadian government 
to convey to the public its resolve to reduce then-rampant inflation. 
rrBs have remained a niche program in Canada, currently accounting 
for less than 2 percent of total government debt. The small scale of the 
program is due partly to the quick success of the inflation battle, which 
reduced the public’s inflation expectations and perceived inflation risk, 
and partly to improvement in the government’s fiscal balances and the 
consequent reduction of borrowing needs. 
IIGSs gained more public attention in 1997 when the U.S. Treasury 
started its program of Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS). 
The first such security was a 10-year note issued in January 1997. Trea-
sury has since issued 10-year TIPS at least twice per year. It has also issued 
5-year, 20-year, and 30-year TIPS. Currently, three lengths of maturity 
of TIPS are issued annually: the 5-year, the 10-year, and the 20-year. 
TIPS account for a large portion of new issuance in long-term securities. 
However, due to Treasury’s heavy reliance on shorter-term debt (maturi-
ties of 5-years or less), TIPS currently account for only 11 percent of total 
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After the United States, France and Italy also started IIGS programs. 
The French started issuing IIGSs in 1998, initially using the French 
consumer price index, excluding tobacco products.8 After the launch of 
the single currency of euro, the inflation index was changed in 2001 to 
an index based on the euro zone harmonized consumer price inflation 
(HICP). The Italian program started in 2003 and also uses the HICP as 
the inflation index.
II.  POTENTIAL  BENEFITS  OF  INFLATION-INDEXED 
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
IIGSs have been adopted by a number of developed countries be-
cause they may bring important benefits to investors and governments. 
The potential benefits include better risk sharing in the economy, reduced 
government borrowing costs, less incentive for a deeply indebted govern-
ment to inflate away its debt, and a new source of information about 
investors’ inflation outlooks.
iiGSs allow better risk sharing between investors and government  
The most important benefit of an IIGS is that it allows better risk 
sharing in an economy. Inflation risk is the risk that future realized in-
flation may be different from people’s expectations. Conventional debt 
securities force investors to bear this risk because the principal and cou-
pon payments of a conventional debt are fixed in nominal terms. As a 
result, higher-than-expected inflation reduces the real rates of return of 
conventional debt. For example, when investors buy a conventional 10-
year Treasury note at the auction yield of 4 percent, collectively they have 
locked-in a nominal return of 4 percent for ten years.9 But the real rate of 
return, measured by the purchasing power of today’s money, depends on 
inflation during the life of the note. If the average inflation rate for the 
next ten years is 2.5 percent, the real rate of return will be 1.5 percent 
(4-2.5=1.5). But if the average inflation rate for the next ten years turns 
out to be higher, say, 4 percent, then the real rate of return for investors 
will be zero. Clearly, many investors do not like inflation risk.
In addition, inflation risk is difficult for individual investors to hedge. 
While values of general stock indexes or land tend to rise with inflation in 
the long run, these assets have other risks investors may not like. Further, 
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tend to be poor hedges of inflation. Campbell and vuolteenaho document-
ed the short-term negative correlation between stock returns and infla-
tion. Hartzell and others found that real estate securities are worse hedges 
against inflation than stocks in some countries and comparable to stocks 
in other countries.
With IIGSs, the risk of higher-than-expected inflation is shifted from 
investors to the government. Governments are better able to bear such 
risk because taxes are typically levied on nominal income, which tends to 
increase with inflation.10 Therefore, government tax receipts usually grow 
with inflation as well, providing the government the income to make the 
higher nominal payments offered by IIGSs. 
iiGSs may reduce government borrowing costs  
This benefit naturally follows the better risk sharing provided by 
IIGSs. When a government borrows in the form of conventional debt, 
investors who do not like inflation risk typically require a higher rate of 
return on securities to compensate them for bearing the inflation risk. This 
additional return is called the inflation-risk premium. The inflation-risk 
premium increases the borrowing costs for the government, and eliminat-
ing the risk premium by replacing the conventional debt with IIGSs lowers 
the borrowing costs. 
The savings to the government achieved through IIGSs are desirable 
from society’s point of view. Lower government borrowing costs imply 
lower burdens for taxpayers, as they are ultimately responsible for paying 
government borrowing costs. At the same time, investors are no worse off 
with IIGSs, even though IIGSs have lower expected real rates of returns, 
because investors do not have to bear the inflation risk.11 
iiGSs reduce the ability of a deeply indebted government to inflate away 
its debt  
An issuer of conventional debt usually gains when realized inflation 
is higher than expected at the time of the debt issuance, because higher 
inflation reduces the real costs of the fixed nominal payments of the debt. 
The reverse also holds true: If realized inflation is lower than expected, the 
issuer’s real cost of the debt service burden increases. Most developed coun-
tries today have considerable government debt. Thus, financing debt with 
conventional debt securities creates an “inflation benefit” to these govern-
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is conducted through IIGSs, the real interest cost of which is fixed at the 
time of the issuance, the ability of a government to inflate away its debt 
will be curtailed. 
reducing a government’s ability to inflate away its debt generally 
helps the country achieve low and stable inflation. Monetary policy used 
to be conducted by the government in a number of developed countries 
and still is in many developing countries. IIGSs reduce the ability of gov-
ernments to inflate away their debt burdens and therefore help anchor the 
public’s inflation expectations (Monks). Even in countries where mon-
etary policy is conducted by independent central banks, as in most devel-
oped countries nowadays, a large fiscal debt may induce an inflation bias 
in some politicians, who in turn may make the central bank’s work more 
difficult. In both cases, reducing the ability of government treasurers and 
politicians to inflate away its debt should help to create an environment 
more conducive to low and stable inflation.
iiGSs may provide a new source of information on investors’ in-
flation outlook  
The fourth potential benefit of IIGSs is that the market yields of these 
securities may provide valuable information to both market analysts and 
policymakers about investors’ inflation outlook.13
In the past, yields on conventional government debt securities, based on 
market trading prices, were closely monitored by both policymakers and the 
private sector, as these yields contain information on inflation compensation: 
(1)  nominal yield on a conventional security = real interest rate + 
inflation compensation.
Inflation compensation has two components. One is the inflation 
expectation and the other is the inflation-risk premium. An increase in in-
flation compensation can be due to either increases in investors’ expected 
future inflation or to increases in their required inflation-risk premium, 
or both. In all three cases, an increase in inflation compensation would 
be an indication of less investor confidence in the central bank’s ability to 
control future inflation and therefore is closely monitored. Nevertheless, 
as one cannot directly observe inflation compensation, but only its sum 
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The addition of IIGSs provides a new source of information about 
inflation compensation: the difference between the yields on a conven-
tional government debt and on an IIGS with comparable maturity. This 
yield difference is often called “breakeven inflation,” and its changes can 
be viewed as changes in inflation compensation if certain assumptions are 
correct.14 To see this, note first that:
(2)  real yield on an iiGS = real interest rate + liquidity premium. 
The liquidity premium is the compensation that investors require for 
holding a security less liquid than conventional government debt. (This 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.) The difference be-
tween (1) and (2) is:
(3)  breakeven inflation = (1) – (2) = inflation compensation – liquid-
ity premium.
If the liquidity premium in the IIGS is small or roughly constant, 
then changes in breakeven inflation will be a good proxy for changes in 
inflation compensation. As a result, in countries with IIGS programs, 
breakeven inflation is closely monitored by both market analysts and 
policymakers to gauge changes in investors’ inflation compensation. 
When the liquidity premium is nontrivial and time varying, changes 
in breakeven inflation cannot be translated one-to-one to changes in 
inflation compensation. Nevertheless, combining the observations of 
changes in the market yields of both conventional and IIGS govern-
ment debt may allow analysts to obtain more precise estimates of 
changes in inflation compensation.15 
III.  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  DEVELOPING  A  LIQUID 
MARKET FOR IIGSS
As explained in the last section, a number of important potential ben-
efits arise from using IIGSs to finance government debt. Experiences of the 
adopters of IIGSs suggest, however, that turning these potential benefits 
into reality requires deep, liquid IIGS markets, which presents a signifi-
cant challenge. This section discusses the importance of liquid markets for 
IIGSs and then investigates why liquid markets seem hard to achieve. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  97
Why liquid markets are necessary to achieve the potential benefits 
of iiGSs  
Liquid markets are necessary to fully capture the benefits of IIGSs. 
Without such markets, there would be a sizable liquidity premium in the 
yield of the securities. The liquidity premium is the additional yield a fi-
nancial asset must carry to compensate its investors for having to trade it 
in less-liquid markets.16 A less-liquid trading market is characterized by 
higher trading costs. In general, investors need to adjust their portfolios 
frequently due to changes in their personal finances or investment oppor-
tunities. When they adjust their portfolios, they will incur trading costs. 
Ultimately, what matters to investors is the expected rate of return net of 
transaction costs. Therefore, everything else equal, securities that cost more 
to trade will have to carry an additional yield relative to other similar secu-
rities with more liquid markets to offset the higher transaction cost. This 
additional yield is called the liquidity premium.
A large liquidity premium can reduce the benefits of IIGSs in sev-
eral ways. First, a large liquidity premium can substantially increase 
the interest costs to a government in financing its borrowing through 
IIGSs. In fact, if the size of the liquidity premium is comparable to the 
inflation-risk premium on conventional debt, there will be no cost sav-
ings to the government from replacing conventional debt with IIGSs. 
In addition, the presence of a sizable liquidity premium is likely to 
discourage a government from issuing a large amount of IIGSs. But if 
an IIGS program is only a niche program, the benefits of better risk 
sharing in the economy will be limited. Further, because the bulk of 
total government borrowing will still be in conventional debt securi-
ties, the ability of the government to inflate away its debt will hardly 
be reduced. Finally, poor market liquidity is not only likely to cause a 
sizable liquidity premium, but is also likely to be associated with a vari-
able liquidity premium, making it more difficult to extract information 
about investors’ inflation compensation from breakeven inflation. For 
example, during the financial market crisis in the fall of 1998, the 10-
year breakeven rate of inflation in the United States fell under 1 per-
cent, mostly due to increases in the size of the liquidity premium.17 
The size of the liquidity premium is related not only to trading 
costs, but also to how frequently the security is expected to be traded. 
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ity of exposition, suppose the trading cost of a conventional Treasury 
security is zero. Say the yield of such a Treasury bond is currently 4 
percent. Now consider another bond exactly like this Treasury bond in 
every aspect, except that whenever investors buy or sell it, the trading 
cost is equivalent to 0.1 percentage point of the yield. Because this sec-
ond bond is fundamentally the same as the first one, it is natural that 
investors would require the same rate of return for both bonds net of 
the transaction costs. Therefore, if the expected trading frequency of 
the second bond is twice a year, then the second bond would have to 
carry a yield of 4.2 percent (4 + 0.1*2) to be attractive to investors. The 
additional 0.2 percentage point of yield is the liquidity premium.18 
This example further demonstrates that as investors’ trading frequen-
cies tend to vary over time (for example, more frequent trading may be 
desirable during financial crises), the liquidity premium tends to vary 
over time as well.
Why liquid markets are hard to develop for iiGSs
 The markets for IIGSs tend to have poor liquidity because, first, these 
securities are new and fundamentally different from traditional debt se-
curities. Most traditional debt securities come with fixed nominal cou-
pon payments and par principals. An IIGS, however, typically has vari-
able nominal coupon and principal payments, which vary with realized 
inflation during the holding period. Investors appear to find it difficult to 
evaluate this new form of debt security. 
The second reason there is typically much less trading of IIGSs 
is that they are usually poor candidates for hedging purposes, which 
reduces  their  trading  activity  considerably  as  much  daily  trading 
arises from hedging needs. A hedging strategy usually involves using 
securities with similar exposures but offsetting responses to a risk to 
construct a portfolio to manage the risk. The main risk of IIGSs is 
the risk that market-clearing real interest rates may change over time. 
very few other financial assets have such a simple risk exposure, mak-
ing IIGSs unique, yet not useful in hedging activity.19 In comparison, 
the trading markets for conventional government debt securities are 
among the most liquid financial markets in many countries, partly 
because these securities are used to hedge a variety of other debt secu-
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kets for conventional government debt securities are often viewed as 
the benchmark, and liquidity premia on such securities are negligible 
for most purposes.
The third reason that IIGSs tend to have poor liquidity lies in their 
investors’ preferences. As IIGSs provide good long-term protection against 
inflation, they are particularly appealing to long-term investors, especially 
those whose future obligations are tied to inflation, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies. These investors, however, often are happy to 
leave an IIGS in their portfolios until maturity and therefore trade them 
little. For these reasons, trading markets for relatively new IIGSs tend to 
have poor liquidity, and consequently, the yields of IIGSs may include 
large liquidity premia.20 
To summarize, while IIGSs can be very beneficial to the society, a 
country must develop liquid markets for these securities to achieve their 
full benefits. 
IV.  DEVELOPING  LIQUID  MARKETS  FOR  IIGSS— 
LESSONS LEARNED
The experience of IIGS programs in many developed countries dem-
onstrates the importance of developing market liquidity, which turns out 
to be a difficult task. Some common lessons can be drawn from such ex-
perience, which going forward may help these countries as well as new-
comers. Chief among the lessons are the following: The design of an IIGS 
should be chosen carefully to make a security that is easy to understand 
and trade. The government should be willing to make a sizable initial in-
vestment in their program to help develop the market. And the ideal tim-
ing of initiation is generally before the arrival of persistent fiscal borrowing 
due to long-term factors. 
The design of an iiGS
 The design of an IIGS directly affects its appeal to the public. A well-
designed IIGS makes it easier for the public to understand and trade and 
therefore increases investor demand and market liquidity. Design issues 
include forms, indexes, and maturities. 
Many forms of IIGSs have been tried.21 The form of principal index-
ation with a fixed coupon rate turns out to have been the most popular 
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and all countries listed in Table 1 have converged to it over time, suggesting 
that this form is most conducive to a deep and liquid market for IIGSs. 
Australia started its IIGS program with the principal indexation form, 
called the Commonwealth Government Capital Indexed Bond (CIB). 
The government then immediately introduced an Indexed Annuity Bond 
(IAB). An IAB pays its holders quarterly for a fixed length of period, in 
this case either ten or 20 years. The initial payment is called the “base pay-
ment,” and the subsequent payments are indexed to the cumulative infla-
tion since issuance. At maturity, the quarterly payments simply terminate. 
The main difference between an IAB and CIB is that there is no principal 
payment at the time of maturity for an IAB. Because investor interest in 
IABs was limited, these securities were issued for just three years (McCray; 
Deacon and others). 
Sweden started its IIGS program in 1994 with a 20-year, zero-coupon 
bond. In this case, investors will not receive any payments until 2014 when 
the bond matures, at which time they will receive a lump-sum payment 
which, after adjusting for the cumulative inflation from 1994 to 2014, 
gives investors the real rate of return set at the time of the issuance. Investor 
reception to this bond was somewhat hesitant, and the Swedish govern-
ment switched to the more common, principal-indexation type of IIGS in 
1997 (Deacon and others).
These experiences suggest that the principal-indexation form of IIGS 
is likely a better design. Part of its appeal may lie in its simplicity: While 
the nominal values of the principal and the coupon payments grow with 
inflation, they both are fixed in real terms. Therefore, substituting real rates 
for nominal rates, many concepts and tools used in analyzing conventional 
debt securities can be applied to this form of IIGS.22 
The index used to adjust for inflation, as well as the indexation lag, 
have also converged across countries over time. All countries discussed ear-
lier essentially use an overall CPI for their index. The indexation lag is an-
other issue that may affect the appeal of an IIGS and therefore its liquidity. 
Indexation lag is unavoidable due to lags in collecting and publishing infla-
tion data as well as to the need to know the accrued inflation adjustments 
since the previous coupon payment date to allow trading and settlement 
before the next coupon payment date. Practically, the minimal lag is about 
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IIGS countries afterward. In the UK, the lag was initially eight months but 
has been cut to three months.23 
The maturity of an IIGS may also affect its appeal to investors. As 
investors generally consider it more difficult to predict inflation in the dis-
tant future, an IIGS with longer maturity tends to be more popular with 
investors. For example, in the UK, the government has experimented with 
various lengths of maturity for the index-linked gilts, from six years to 50 
years. Based on investor reception, recent issuance has concentrated on the 
longer spectrum. In fact, many developed countries currently only issue 
IIGSs with a maturity of ten years or longer, although the U.S. Treasury 
still issues 5-year TIPS. 
initial investment  
Experience also suggests that IIGSs are fundamentally so very differ-
ent from conventional debt securities that acceptance takes considerable 
learning on the part of investors. Therefore, for an IIGS program to be 
successful, a government needs to be willing to make a sizable initial invest-
ment that includes educating and working with investors, committing to 
continuous issuance to allow for a gradual development of an investor base 
and market infrastructures, and possibly paying high yields (due to liquid-
ity premia) for earlier IIGSs to help the market reach a critical scale. 
Currently, both the UK and United States have very active IIGS 
programs due to the considerable initial investment from their respec-
tive governments. The UK was the first developed country to launch an 
IIGS program. When the first 15-year gilt was issued in March 1981, 
only pension funds were allowed to participate in their auction.24 After 
initial success, demand for the index-linked gilt weakened, partly due 
to the quick decline of inflation (Chart 1). But the UK government 
persevered. They published studies and pamphlets to help investors 
understand index-linked gilts. The Bank of England has made the 
trading prices and yields of the securities easily accessible to the pub-
lic, just as they do for conventional government debt securities. The 
restriction on ownership was quickly removed to allow the expansion 
of the investor base. A few refinements to the program have also been 
made to encourage investor interest and participation. For example, 
both auction schedules and auction formats have been adjusted to bet-
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The UK government has also made a conscious effort to provide a 
supply of fresh IIGSs to investors. For example, it maintained the IIGS 
program even when its fiscal balance was in surplus in the late 1980s.26 A 
supply of fresh IIGSs is important to the development of trading market 
liquidity. At the beginning of an IIGS program, the outstanding volume 
is naturally small and due to the attraction of the securities to long-term 
investors, many of the existing ones may have been “locked away” in some 
buy-and-hold portfolios. Therefore, for the trading market to develop, it 
is important that fresh new issues are offered to investors. Since 1998, the 
UK authority has committed to supplying at least 2.5 billion pounds of 
new IIGSs each fiscal year. 
With its long history and steadfast support from the government, the 
IIGS market in the UK is now considered one of the more liquid ones. 
The outstanding IIGSs represent close to 30 percent of total government 
debt, and the secondary trading market is active.27 While there are most 
likely still liquidity premia in yields of index-linked gilts, their magnitudes 
are likely no larger than inflation-risk premia in conventional gilts (Shen 
and Corning). 
The U.S. experience also demonstrates the necessity of initial invest-
ment. Treasury has spent considerable effort in investor education since the 
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launch of TIPS. For example, in addition to providing many pamphlets 
about TIPS, Treasury has developed a comprehensive website regarding 
the security.28 Treasury also launched inflation-indexed savings bonds (I-
bonds) soon after the launch of TIPS. This program has helped individual 
investors understand the concept of inflation-indexed securities and pos-
sibly increased their interest in TIPS.29 
Tapping its expertise in developing highly liquid markets for conven-
tional Treasury securities, Treasury understood the importance of a regu-
lar supply to market liquidity and thus committed to regular issuance of 
the 10-year TIPS early on. Since its debut in 1997, every January a new 
10-year TIPS has been issued, which typically reopens in July the same 
year.30 This issuance schedule was maintained even around 2000 when the 
Treasury had to discontinue some other conventional debt issuance due 
to budget surpluses and reduced borrowing needs. regular issuance helps 
professional investors plan ahead in managing their portfolios and makes it 
possible for the private sector to set up mutual funds and exchange traded 
funds (ETFs) specializing in TIPS. It also makes comparing prices among 
older and newer TIPS more straightforward and therefore promotes arbi-
trage-induced trading in these securities.31 
Even with these efforts, the liquidity premia remained considerable in 
early TIPS.32 For example, the first ten auctions of the 10-year TIPS had 
an average auction yield of 3.8 percent. In comparison, the average auction 
yield for 10-year conventional treasuries for the same period was about 5.7 
percent. Given that expected inflation for the next ten years at the time 
was about 2.5 percent, according to credible survey evidence, the minimal 
amount of liquidity premium that Treasury paid in these earlier TIPS was 
about 0.6 percentage point.33 
After a slow start, TIPS have gradually been accepted by investors 
and become an integral part of U.S. government debt financing, espe-
cially in the long-term debt sector. Last year, roughly a third of U.S. 
government borrowing at maturities of ten years or beyond was through 
TIPS.34 Market liquidity also appeared to have improved somewhat until 
the current financial crisis, which has brought considerable increases in 
liquidity premia in many assets. Looking forward, liquidity premium 
will likely remain a component of the yields of TIPS, and thus caution is 
advised when deriving information about investor inflation compensa-
tion from breakeven inflation (Shen 2006, Gurkeynak and others).35 104  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Timing the launch of iiGSs
Timing the introduction of an IIGS program plays a role in its success. 
The most important factor to be considered in determining the timing is 
fiscal outlook. If significant and persistent fiscal borrowing is projected in 
the not-too-distant future, then it may be advisable to launch (or enhance) 
an IIGS before the large amount of borrowing needs materializes, as it 
usually takes considerable time to convince investors that large amounts of 
IIGSs can be issued at reasonable rates. On the other hand, if a country has 
little fiscal debt and is projected to have an essentially balanced fiscal bud-
get going forward, it may be better not to launch an IIGS program. One 
reason is that the benefits of an IIGS are significant only when a country 
has accumulated sizable national debt or has to finance persistent fiscal 
deficits. Another reason not to launch a new program is that the uncertain 
supply of an IIGS when fiscal budgets are close to balanced will exacerbate 
poor liquidity conditions, leading to a large liquidity premium in the IIGS 
that would offset the benefits. 
Australia’s experience illustrates that without a steady, consistent sup-
ply of IIGSs, it is difficult for investors to be comfortable with the new 
security. Consequently, the poor market liquidity tends to be exacerbated. 
Australia was an early adopter of IIGSs, issuing its first security in 1985. 
After some challenging early years, investors began to gain a better under-
standing of the new securities. Auction results improved by early 1988, 
with the real yield falling from over 6 percent to under 5 percent (Mc-
Cray). A sharp improvement in the government’s budget, however, led 
to an early suspension of the IIGS program (Chart 2). The issuance of 
inflation-indexed debt securities by some state governments and utility au-
thorities kept the interest in indexed securities alive. The trading market 
was underdeveloped, though, without the participation of fresh IIGSs. In 
1993, with the federal budget returning to sizable deficits, the government 
reopened the IIGS program and put in more effort to improve the market 
infrastructure. But before markets were fully developed, the government 
suspended the IIGS program again in 2003 as a result of its sustained bud-
get surplus since the late 1990s.36 
The U.S. experience provides additional support for the importance 
of fiscal outlook. The United States launched its TIPS program in early 
1997 when the government’s long-term fiscal health was slowly improving 
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cording to the Congressional Budget Office. In subsequent years, however, 
larger than expected fiscal surpluses poured in. With the rapid decline in 
borrowing needs, some TIPS issuance was suspended, such as the 5-year 
and 30-year TIPS, casting doubt on the viability of TIPS program. This 
uncertainty might have contributed to the persistently large liquidity pre-
mium in TIPS. With the return of chronic fiscal deficits, a new annual 
issuance of 20-year TIPS was introduced in 2004, and 5-year TIPS were 
resumed in 2005. The reduced doubt as to the future of TIPS since then 
appears to have helped improve market liquidity. While it is difficult to 
estimate precisely, two recent studies (one by the author and the other by 
Carlstrom and Fuerst) suggest that the liquidity premium declined slightly 
from 2003 to 2006 (Chart 3). 
These experiences suggest the long-term fiscal outlook can significant-
ly affect the supply of IIGSs and hence market liquidity. If a country is ex-
pected to have an essentially balanced fiscal budget in the near future, then 
the benefits of an IIGS program will be limited and unlikely to justify the 
necessary initial investment. On the other hand, such a program might be 
justified for a country projected to need persistent fiscal borrowing in the 
near future, such as many developed countries with large numbers of baby 
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boomers retiring in the coming decades. Given the long process needed to 
develop market liquidity, it may be advisable for these countries to start an 
IIGS program sooner rather than later. Thus, a considerable portion of the 
projected future borrowing could be conducted through IIGSs. 
Historically, some countries launched their IIGS programs when the 
level of inflation and the public concerns about inflation risk were high. 
Naturally, an IIGS program is likely to get better public reception when 
levels of inflation, or concerns about inflation risk, are high. The experi-
ences of the UK and Canada, however, suggest that while IIGS may help 
a country in its battle against inflation, the good reception of an IIGS due 
to high levels of inflation tends to be short-lived. 
The UK launched the modern IIGS program. Many UK economists 
had previously advocated the idea of IIGSs to the government, among 
them John Maynard Keynes. But it took the high inflation of the 1970s 
to convince the UK government. At that time, with surprisingly persis-
tent, high inflation, there were enormous concerns about future inflation 
among the public and widespread demands that the government take deci-
sive actions to reduce inflation (Chart 1). This turned out to be the catalyst 
for the launch of the IIGS. In fact, one of the chief reasons given by the 
chart 3
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government for launching the IIGS was to help to convince the public of 
its anti-inflation policy and to reduce its borrowing costs (Monks). 
After the initial success of the index-linked gilts, however, investors’ 
interest in IIGSs waned quickly as the rapid decline of inflation led to lower 
nominal rates of return on an IIGS relative to conventional government 
debt issued in the early 1980s. While the IIGS helped the government 
avoid making high, locked-in nominal coupon payments after inflation 
fell, the securities appeared to be a worse investment than conventional 
debt for investors in an environment of declining inflation. This perception 
distracted investors from focusing on the fundamental benefit of zero infla-
tion risk with index-linked gilts.
The Canadian experience also shows that the initial interest due to high 
inflation anxiety can wane quickly with the decline of inflation, implying 
that launching an IIGS at the height of inflation concerns may not be the 
best timing for success. In Canada, the IIGS program was started about the 
same time the Bank of Canada adopted formal inflation targeting. Both 
programs were part of a concerted effort of the Canadian government to 
convey to the public its resolve to reduce then-rampant inflation. Partly due 
to the quick success of the inflation battle, which drastically reduced the 
public’s inflation expectations and perceived risks of inflation, and partly 
due to improvement in the government fiscal balance and the resulting 
reduction in borrowing needs, IIGSs have remained a tiny niche program 
in Canada. Currently, less than 2 percent of the total outstanding Canadian 
government debt is in IIGSs.
To recap, the experiences of early adopters of IIGS programs in de-
veloped countries suggest that to fully capture the benefits of the IIGSs, 
the securities need to be well-designed to promote easy understanding 
and trading by investors. The government also needs to be willing to un-
dertake a sizeable initial investment and make a long-term commitment 
to the program. While the public’s concern about inflation was a factor 
in the launch of IIGS programs in some countries, the deciding factor 
should be the long-term fiscal outlook, as the benefits may outweigh the 
costs only when a country faces sizable and persistent fiscal borrowing 
needs. Further, given the long learning process on the part of investors, 
countries may be better off to launch the IIGS program well before such 
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V.  CONCLUSION
An IIGS program can provide substantial benefits to a country, espe-
cially one expecting persistent fiscal deficits that will require it to borrow 
heavily in the future. The potential benefits of IIGSs include a better shar-
ing of risks between investors and government, a reduction of government 
borrowing costs, less incentive for a government to inflate away its debt, 
and more information for investors and policymakers about inflation ex-
pectations. For these benefits to be fully achieved, however, the market for 
IIGSs must be highly liquid.
This article studies the experiences of early adopters of IIGS in devel-
oped countries to learn what steps governments can take to improve the 
liquidity of their IIGS markets. The article concludes that governments can 
increase liquidity by designing their securities carefully, by investing heav-
ily in educating the public about the securities, and by making a credible, 
long-term commitment to issuing IIGSs. The article also concludes that 
a government expecting persistent future deficits should launch its IIGS 
far enough in advance of its borrowing needs to allow investors to become 
familiar with the new securities. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  109
ENDNOTES
1Personal income taxes, however, may lower the after-tax real rates of return 
when inflation goes up. Shen (1998) provides such an example.
2Shen (1998) provides a useful summary of the U.S. IIGS program, much of 
which applies to more general IIGS as well.
3Countries have in the past experimented with other indices. For example, 
the French government issued government bonds indexed to the value of gold 
in the 1950s and 1970s. A number of countries have issued government bonds 
whose payments are indexed to some foreign currencies. 
4Some of the materials for the remainder of this section draw from Dea-
con and others. 
5Before the launch of index-linked gilts, which can be freely resold to third 
parties, the UK government had started to issue inflation-indexed nontradable 
national savings certificates aimed at small investors in 1975.
6Interestingly, the State Electricity Commission of victoria issued the first 
inflation-indexed bond in Australia in 1983, before the federal government began 
to issue such securities. 
7Australia’s neighbor, New Zealand, also ventured into IIGSs in 1996, but 
suspended the program after only three years.
8IIGSs, however, were not the first indexed debt instrument issued by the 
French government. It issued bonds indexed to gold prices in the 1950s and again 
in the 1970s. Not surprisingly, with the surge of gold prices in the 1970s and 
1980s, some of these bonds turned out to be very costly for the government and, 
consequently, for French taxpayers. With hindsight, it is clear that the govern-
ment had no advantage in hedging the price risk of gold, and therefore, issuing 
gold-indexed debt was unlikely to promote better risk sharing in the economy.
9While an individual investor may sell the Treasury note before its maturity, 
some other investor will have to buy it. Therefore, collectively, investors have to 
hold it to maturity. For simplicity of exposition, the terms “yields” and “rates of 
return” are used interchangeably in this article, as well as “auction yields” and 
“coupon rates.” Interested readers can easily find the precise definitions and subtle 
differences among these terms in most introductory finance textbooks.
10In other words, the government is naturally “hedged” against inflation. In 
fact, governments can be over-hedged against inflation due to the progressive 
taxes in most developed countries. With progressive taxes, the marginal tax rates 
tend to be higher for higher-income households. As tax brackets deciding the 
marginal tax rates are typically only indexed to inflation with delays, higher infla-
tion tends to push more taxpayers into higher marginal tax rates, increasing the 
share of taxpayers subjected to higher tax rates, leading to higher average taxes.
11Another source of savings to the government is that IIGSs may allow the 
government to pay a smaller inflation risk premium on conventional Treasury 110  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
securities. The reason is that investors who are least tolerant of the inflation risk 
will be drawn to IIGSs, leaving the remaining investors in conventional treasuries 
less sensitive to inflation risk.
12removing such an inflation incentive was one of the reasons given by the UK 
government in launching its IIGS programs. It is also likely part of the rationale for 
taking away the job of controlling inflation from direct government agencies and 
giving it to independent central banks in most developed countries.
13The market prices of IIGS may also provide more information about the 
prevailing market rate of real interest, which can be particularly useful for policy-
makers. For example, as the market rate of real interest tends to fall in economic 
downturns, up-to-date knowledge of this rate may allow a central bank to adjust 
monetary policy quickly, before the actual slowdown is reported by statistical 
agencies, which is typically with a substantial time lag. 
14The difference is called “breakeven inflation” because if future average in-
flation equals the difference, then the returns for buy-and-hold investors are the 
same, thus breakeven, for the conventional debt and the IIGS. 
15For details about obtaining market inflation expectations from IIGS, see 
Gurkeynak and others as well as Shen and Corning.
16It is sometimes also called the liquidity risk premium, as part of the ad-
ditional yield is to compensate investors for bearing the risk that trading costs 
may increase suddenly in an illiquid market (Shen and Starr). Liquidity premia 
in U.S. TIPS have widened considerably in the recent financial crisis, confirming 
that liquidity premia are also risk premia that may vary greatly over time.
17Liquidity premia tend to increase during financial crises. For example, in 
the 1998 crisis, there were widespread increases in liquidity premia in many fi-
nancial assets, including dated (off-the-run) conventional treasuries. In the cur-
rent financial crisis, similar increases in liquidity premia have been observed. In 
particular, some of the breakeven rates of inflation on TIPS in the U.S. fell greatly 
in the fall of 2008 as the crisis deepened.
18Amihud and Mendelson provide a general model for this kind of liquidity 
premium. The actual size of the liquidity premium is an empirical issue. In the U.S., 
different estimates of the liquidity premium lead to disagreements as to whether on 
net TIPS actually reduce government borrowing costs (roush and others).
19The second major risk in IIGS is, ironically, the liquidity risk: the risk that 
their trading markets will be particularly illiquid and that the liquidity premia 
in their yields will increase considerably during financial crises. Liquidity risk is 
generally as difficult to hedge as it is asset/market specific.
20For example, Deacon and others report that in the UK, trading cost is still 
much higher for index-linked gilts as “the bid-ask spreads charged by dealers [are] 
widely accepted to be significantly wider than those for conventional gilts.”
21Examples include the principal indexation form with fixed coupon rate, 
the annuity bond with payment indexation, the zero coupon bond with fixed real Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  111
growth rate of principal, and the coupon rate indexed to inflation. One form that 
was considered but not adopted in the U.S. was to have fixed nominal coupon 
payments but also pay out all growth in the nominal value of the principal due to 
inflation each period.  
22There are, however, exceptions. For example, the concept of duration is not 
easily applied to IIGSs (see footnote 22, Shen 1998).
23Originally, it was thought necessary to have knowledge of the next coupon 
payments for trades to settle before the next coupon payment day. As a result, the 
lag was set at eight months: two for the data collection delay, and six for the semi-
annual coupon pay day. With the three-month delay, trades are settled without the 
knowledge of the next coupon payments, only the accrued coupon payments up to 
the trading day, but that is sufficient to allow trades to complete.
24Even though investors were very interested in such a bond, there were also 
a lot of uncertainties about what would be the reasonable rate on the new bond, 
reflected in an unusually wide range of auction bids. In anticipation of the investors’ 
hesitation, the auction format was a single-price format, meaning all winning bids 
bought the bond at the same yield. Its coupon rate was eventually set at 2 percent.
25For example, after several auctions left considerable amounts of the planned 
index-linked gilt unsold, auctions were suspended in 1988 and index-linked gilts 
were only sold through reopening existing ones. Auctions were resumed in 1998 
when it was judged to suit market demand.
26When the fiscal budget turned to surplus in the late 1980s, auctions of 
new gilts had to be cut back and some of the existing debt bought back. The UK 
government limited the buyback program to conventional gilts to help maintain 
the liquidity in the IIGS market, although the issuance of new IIGS had to be 
suspended. They were resumed in 1998.
27Deacon and others report that the over-the-counter derivative market in 
the indexed gilts has also grown in the UK, which should help the liquidity in the 
primary trading market.
28http://www.savingsbonds.gov/indiv/products/prod_tips_glance.htm.
29TIPS are “marketable” as they can be traded to a third party freely. Savings 
bonds, in contrast, are non-marketable, but can be redeemed before maturity. Sav-
ings bonds have long been popular among small investors as an easy and safe way 
to save small amounts of money for the long term.
30The reopening of a security is the issuance of an additional amount with the 
same maturity date and coupon rate as the original security but usually a different 
purchase price.
31TIPS are also set to be eligible for STrIPS programs (their coupons and 
principals can be traded separately) to give investors more flexibility and trading 
opportunities and, hopefully, better market liquidity.
32As liquidity premia are measured relative to conventional treasuries, one of 
the reasons that they appear to be high is that conventional treasuries are excep-112  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
tionally liquid. This liquidity is due to the fact that conventional treasuries are 
not only widely used for hedging purposes, but also for collateral for short-term 
funding (re-purchase agreements) in the U.S. 
33Assuming the inflation risk premium in the conventional debt securities 
to be zero gives the minimal magnitude of liquidity premium. For the example 
in the text, equation (3) then implies liquidity premium =  2.5 – (5.7 – 3.8) = 
0.6. If the inflation risk premium in the conventional debt was nonzero, then the 
liquidity premium would be even higher. Nevertheless, as the Treasury saves on 
the inflation risk premium, 0.6 percentage point is still a good measure of the cost 
to the Treasury of developing the TIPS market.
34The share of TIPS in total Treasury debt, however, has declined in recent 
years, as Treasury has shifted much of its borrowing to the shorter end of the ma-
turity spectrum since 2001.
35In fact, liquidity premia appear to have increased considerably since March 
2008 as the current financial crisis has spread and deepened. For example, the 10-
year breakeven rate fell to less than 0.5 percent for some days in October, most 
likely due to the dramatic increase in the liquidity premium caused by heightened 
concern about liquidity risk. Market participants appear to be particularly wary 
about liquidity risk during financial crises, possibly due to the impossibility of 
hedging such a risk.
36Canada provides a similar example that the improvement in fiscal budgets 
and outlook limited the development (and benefits) of their IIGS program.Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  113
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